Hart and Holmstrom (2010) claim that organizational form conditions the sense of entitlement of the parties. This determines their feeling of being aggrieved by the outcome of the contract and therefore their shading, which creates deadweight losses. Cooperatives constitute integrated organizational forms while privately owned firms are nonintegrated. The main result obtained states that if the intensity of shading depends positively on the existing payoff imbalances between bosses and managers, then (non)integration with coordination is more plausible when the profits of bosses and benefits of managers are (dis)similar. Moreover, given plausible parameter constraints, we illustrate how both organizational forms, an integrated cooperative and a nonintegrated private firm, may coexist in a coordinated equilibrium and how the former may even obtain a higher social surplus than the latter one.
Introduction
Privately (investor) owned firms and cooperatives coexist in many market sectors, with particular emphasis in the agricultural one, of modern economies where they compete actively for market share (Hansmann, 1996; Hendrikse, 1998; Sexton and Lavoie, 2001 ). Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) provide data from the European Commission illustrating how cooperatives account for considerable market shares in most European Member States, particularly in the agri-food chain.
In this regard, Hendrikse has analyzed formally through several papers the coexistence of both governance structures, i.e. types of firms, within a given market sector. He has done so mainly through principal-agent models (Hendrikse, 2007) , while highlighting the relative efficiency of cooperatives as equilibrium organisational forms when dealing with a different decision-making process (Hendrikse, 1998) . Similar conclusions are reached when considering cooperatives from an incomplete contracting perspective (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001 ).
On the other hand, when comparing cooperatives with privately owned firms, Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) suggest that members of the cooperative have an incentive to free-ride on quality. Similarly, Bontems and Fulton (2010) present a theoretical model where the efficiency advantage of a cooperative "is directly linked to the goal alignment between the cooperative and its members, and is influenced by the extent of income redistribution between members and the degree of rent seeking that takes place in the organization (p. 322)". These authors concentrate on the information costs and redistribution policies faced by a cooperative. We build our model on a similar intuition in terms of alignment of objectives between the members of a cooperative but follow an approach based on the contract as reference points framework of Hart and Holmstrom (2010) .
In doing so, we provide a link between the traditional research on the coexistence of different governance structures, which is generally based on agency-related problems, and the main characteristics related to the emergence of new generation cooperatives. These new generation cooperatives are defined as organizational hybrids that combine aspects of investor and traditional cooperative ownership structures (Katz and Boland, 2002) . These authors present a summary of the five main property rights problems exhibited by traditional cooperatives and the solutions defined by the new generation ones. We have described these problems and interpreted the main trend implicit in the shift from traditional to new generation cooperatives in Table 1 .
Principal-agent models address these agency problems by designing contracts to mitigate the frictions arising due to conflicting interests and asymmetric information. However, as emphasized by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) , the property rights approach assumes that any conflict arising after the contract is agreed upon is resolved through bargaining with side payments. They argue that "many decisions made in a firm will be carried out without consultation or negotiation with other firms even when these decisions impact the other firms in a major way. It is rare, for instance, for a firm to go to a competitor with the intention of extracting side payments for avoiding aggressive moves (p. 484)." Thus, the shading taking place whenever a party feels aggrieved after signing the contract remains outside the scope of the original contract initially agreed upon by the parties. The aggrievement model of Hart and Holmstrom (2010) addresses conflicting interests by adopting an organizational form to mitigate the effect of shading. In this regard, the findings on social comparison obtained by the psychology literature have been incorporated by the economics and strategic management ones to analyze incentive differentials and shading problems.
The literature on social comparison follows from the fact that individuals acquire information on other people who are similar to them, while being affected by the resulting comparisons (Festinger, 1954) . Applied to the current setting, it implies that "when deciding how much effort to exude, workers respond not only to their own compensation but also to pay relative to their peers as they socially compare (Larkin et al. (2012 (Larkin et al. ( ), p. 1200 (Larkin et al. ( -1201 ." Economists and (strategic) managers have argued that these comparisons may lead to envy and provide incentives to sabotage other workers within the same organization (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010) . The importance of social comparisons has been empirically illustrated by (Blinder and Choi, 1990) , as well its effect on the reduction of effort among workers (Cohn et al., 2012) and the emergence of unethical behavior (Gino and Pierce, 2010) . Moreover, this phenomenon has also been shown to lead to escalations in the salaries of executives and among employees within a given firm (Faulkender and Yang, 2010) .
Though we will not formalize the shift between both types of cooperatives within our model, the shift in their characteristics when dealing with the property rights problems described in Table 1 provides important intuition regarding the results obtained in this paper. The differences in objectives and, therefore, potential payoffs described by these five points indicate that low coordination incentives do not necessarily prevent the existence of a cooperative structure but damage its performance severely. Consider, for example, the free riding problem and note how new generation cooperatives align the individual benefits of their members before they start operating. This is also the case when choosing the portfolio of the cooperative. Similarly, an increment in coordination incentives between the members can be observed when dealing with the control and influence problems, with the horizon one being solved by allowing members to enter or exit the cooperative based on the alignment of their liquidity interests with those of the cooperative.
Thus, the success of (new generation) cooperatives in dealing with standard property right problems is based on the alignment of objectives and payoffs among its members, that is, an increment in their coordination incentives. This alignment will be used in our model to determine the incentives of the members to shade on a given agreement and disrupt potential coordination incentives among them.
Tradable stock to allow for entry and exit from the cooperative.
Lack of liquidity.

Horizon
The residual claims of members on asset income is shorter than the productive life of the asset.
Level of investment in assets is decided before the cooperative starts operating.
Investment decision is tied to patronage decision.
Portfolio
Financial rigidity of asset portfolios due to lack of transferability and appreciation.
Centralized and limited to a specific purpose.
Influence depends on centralization of authority and homogeneity of members.
Influence
Members try to influence the range of activities offered by the co-operative.
Greater property rights alignment through patronagebased voting.
Absence of information and external pressure by public trading.
Control
Agency costs due to diverging interests between the board, members and managers.
Investment and optimal levels of product flows are determined before the firm becomes operative.
Individual benefits and property rights are not well aligned.
Free Riding
Members use firm resources for individual benefits.
"New Generation" Behavior Traditional Coop Behavior Problems
Increment in Coordination Incentives
Potential Frictions Table 1 . Property rights problems and behaviour of traditional versus new generation cooperatives. Source: Based on Figure 1 in Katz and Boland (2002) .
From a literature standpoint, following Cook (1995) and Hendrikse (1998) , it can be argued that new generation cooperatives arise so as to account for the property rights problems described in Table 1 , with a similar conclusion being reached by Borgen (2004) from a socio-economic perspective. As already described, the shift between both types of cooperative may be interpreted as an increment in the coordination incentives among the members of the cooperative. In this regard, as stated by Holmstrom and Roberts (1998, p. 92) : "… high degrees of frequency and mutual dependency seem to support, rather than hinder, ongoing co-operation across firm boundaries". We build on these existing interdependencies to design our model while, at the same time, moving beyond the property rights-based interpretation presented by Katz and Boland (2002) .
The current paper presents a formal model illustrating how cooperatives [integrated organizations] and private firms [nonintegrated organizations] can coexist within a market while obtaining different surpluses. We build on the model developed by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) to analyze the strategic choice of organizational form among producers. For example, one can consider wineries as being composed by growers and winemakers. Growers could delegate the winemaking process to an external winemaker or contribute to the winemaking process themselves. When growers delegate to an external manager [integration] , their individual contributions to the process are not explicitly acknowledged, with the winemaker losing complete control over the quality of the production chain. However, if growers interact in the winemaking process themselves [nonintegration], they are able to highlight the quality of their individual contributions within the production chain. In this regard, a higher degree of quality control is exerted over the production chain. This quality coordination problem has been studied by Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) , who show its dependence on the quality aggregation process and the number of members composing a cooperative.
We will particularly concentrate on the similarity of the payoffs received by the parties composing the units within an organization as the main determinant of the boundary choices of firms. Payoff similarities will also be used to show how cooperatives may be uniquely efficient within the current strategic setting due to the lower shading intensity applied by its members. The basic intuition follows from the literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts where organizational forms, when agreed upon competitively, condition the sense of entitlement of the parties (Hart and Moore, 2008) .
1 If feeling aggrieved by the outcome of the contract, parties may shade by underperforming, which creates deadweight losses. If ever at all, shading takes place after the organizational form has been chosen.
The basic environment on which our model is built is that of Hart and Holmstrom (2010) , who build on the contracts as reference points approach of Hart and Moore (2008) when determining firm boundaries "to deal with strategic decisions that are taken in the absence of ex post bargaining (p. 484)". We will therefore restate their initial assumptions and maintain their notation. These authors assume that the organizational forms composing the market, i.e. private firms and cooperatives, are given ad hoc and do not consider the choice between them as a result of the effect that payoff differentials have on the coordination game played by the units interacting within the market. We incorporate this feature in the current paper leading to a twostage game that expands the formal setting introduced by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) .
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic model and results following from Hart and Holmstrom (2010) that constitute the basis on which we build our model. The main results obtained are developed both intuitively and formally through Sections 3 and 4. The final section summarizes the main findings and concludes by suggesting potential extensions.
Model
The model described through this section summarizes that of Hart and Holmstrom (2010) and sets the basis for the development of our formal environment, where units will be able to choose the type of organizational structure they want to form before playing the coordination game. The organizational form will be chosen so as to maximize social surplus net of shading costs, which may be incurred after a given organizational form has been agreed upon. In this regard, as already stated, units may either operate independently or delegate in an independent boss who maximizes her joint private profit.
The basic strategic environment is composed by two units, A and B, that have a lateral relationship, i.e. they interact within the same output or input market, such that each unit is operated by a manager who triggers external effects on the other unit. Units are presented with a binary decision, they must choose either 'Yes' or 'No'. Coordination occurs if and only if both units choose 'Yes'. Otherwise, units face noncoordination. In this sense, coordination may be interpreted as the decision of both units to remain as active producers within a joint project while any of them leaving the project results in noncoordination. Two main organizational forms are considered: nonintegration, where units are separate firms whose managers are also the bosses, and integration, where units are part of a single firm with an outside manager acting as the boss and the managers of each unit as subordinates. We will identify nonintegrated organizational forms with private independent firms, while the integrated scenario will be assumed to correspond to a cooperative structure.
Two types of benefits are assumed to be generated by each unit: monetary transferable profits, v i , i = A, B, and private nontransferable benefits, w i , i = A, B, in the form of job satisfaction for the manager working in the corresponding unit. The boss of a unit can divert all profits from the unit to herself, leading to a nonintegrated payoff of v i + w i if she is also the manager of unit i = A, B. Private benefits always reside with the managers. Thus, if both units are integrated, the professional outsider acting as boss receives v A + v B . Note that, under nonintegration both bosses receive the private benefits generated by each unit, which are ignored under integration in favor of total profits. Social surplus is given in both cases by v A + v B + w A + w B .
Independently of the organizational form considered, coordination constitutes an agreement by both units to proceed with a given project and implies a change in the benefits received by the managers of the units and the corresponding bosses. In this regard, following Hart and Holmstrom (2010) and without loss of generality, profits and private benefits will be normalized to zero in both units under noncoordination. Table 2 presents the coordination game between bosses and unit managers. Accordingly, the entries of the table define the change in monetary transferable profits and private nontransferable benefits that results from the coordination decision taken by the bosses and managers of each unit.
Unit B
Unit A Table 2 . Coordination-based payoffs received by bosses and unit managers
The following notation has been introduced to simplify the presentation
where ∆z i , i = A, B, represents the change in total surplus in unit i derived from coordination, and S ≡ ∆z A + ∆z B accounts for the change in aggregate social surplus absent shading costs.
Following Hart and Holmstrom (2010) , coordination is assumed to lead to a reduction in private benefits due to the independence lost by the managers and its effect on job satisfaction, i.e.
Shading will be used to force bosses to internalize the externalities generated on other parties. This may occur under integration and nonintegration, since the relationship between both units is assumed to persist in both settings after the strategic coordination decision is made. It will also be assumed that a party receiving k i less than his maximum payoff will be aggrieved by k i and shade to the point where the payoff received by the other party falls by θk i . Hart and Holmstrom assume that θ ϵ (0,1) is an exogenous value identical for all parties. We will parameterize this variable as a function of the spread existing between coordination profits and private benefits within a given unit.
Yes
No The decision stages leading to the coordination game played by both organizational structures are summarized in Figure 1 and defined as follows 1. Nature. The bosses and managers of both organizational structures observe the values of the benefit variables, v i and w i , the surplus changes derived from coordination, ∆v i and ∆w i , together with ∆z i , with i = A, B, as well as the value of the shading parameter θ.
2. Coordination choice. Given the above values, bosses and managers decide whether or not to coordinate after accounting for the resulting shading costs.
Figure1. Hart and Holmstrom (2010) coordination and ad hoc organizational form choice environment.
The exogenously determined environment introduced by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) assumes that the resulting coordination and organizational form choices are determined de facto by nature. That is, the intensity of shading, a parameter that determines the equilibrium conditions illustrated in Figure 1 , does not result from the interactions taking place within the units composing an organization but is exogenously given ex ante. As described in the introduction, the literature on social comparison provides the required incentives at the psychological, managerial and empirical levels to justify the fact that the value of the shading parameter must be defined endogenously as a result of the payoff differences between the agents composing the different units within the potential resulting organizational structures.
After some basic algebra, the model defined by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) gives place to the following coordination conditions:
• The non-integration coordination condition (NIC) defined for any ∆z i value, i = A, B, is given by (1) is trivially satisfied. However, if ∆z i < 0, and ∆z j > 0, then this condition states that coordination will take place under non-integration only if the costs of shading imposed by manager j on manager i are larger than the losses derived by the latter from coordination. Social surplus in the (NIC) setting [with ∆z i < 0, and ∆z j > 0 ] is therefore given by S NIC = ∆z A + ∆z B + θ∆z i under coordination -θ∆z j under noncoordination.
Note that, if coordination occurs, then unit i will shade by θ∆z i , as it receives a payoff of ∆z i < 0 from coordinating.
• The integration coordination condition (INT) defined for any ∆v i value, i = A, B, is given by
Trivially, if ∆v i ≤ 0, i = A, B, then (2) In order to provide additional intuition for the analysis performed through the rest of the paper, we rewrite the respective (NIC) and (INT) coordination conditions as follows
(2') It should be noted that the lower degree of quality control exerted over the production chain within the cooperative [integrated] environment implies that the contributions of the individual growers to the winemaking process cannot be explicitly acknowledged. As a result, when shading, they can only do so through their respective ∆w A and ∆w B values, as illustrated in equation (2'). On the other hand, private [nonintegrated] wineries are able to recognize the contributions of the individual growers, which allows the latter ones to shade through their entire ∆z B values, as described by equation (1').
Choice of organizational form when shading is a function of misaligned interests
We extend now the model of Hart and Holmstrom (2010) in order to allow both units to choose the organizational form under which to decide whether or not to coordinate. We start by illustrating how, given our definition of shading intensity, managers will be more willing to delegate if their ∆w values are close to the respective ∆v of the boss.
Consider the coordination payoffs received by the managers and the boss within each unit. We parameterize the intensity of the shading parameter θ as a function of the difference in coordination incentives existing between the boss and the unit managers. 
Note that we have to account for the possibility that ∆v i < 0, while knowing that ∆w i < 0 under coordination. We must therefore consider the absolute value of ∆w i within the absolute value expression dealing with the distance separating both payoffs. As a result, a substantial difference between both payoffs leads to an increase in the value of the shading parameter. That is, the strength or effort dedicated by a party to shade depends on the existing differences in objectives (and payoffs) with respect to the other one. This assumption follows directly from the guilt-envy (Fehr-Schmidt) inequality aversion literature based on comparisons of absolute differences in payoffs between the parties. Camerer (2003) provides a review of the literature on this topic. The importance that the shading parameter has in determining the coordination incentives of bosses and managers within both units can be easily illustrated numerically. Proof. If θ = 0, the functions (1') and (2') become respectively ∆v A + ∆w A ≥ 0 and ∆v A + ∆v B ≥ 0.
The result follows from the fact that ∆v B > 0 while ∆w A < 0. ■
The dominance of the integration coordination condition over the non-integration one prevails for all θ < 1, ∆v i , and ∆w i , i = A, B, with INT = NIC trivially when θ = 1. The behavior of the integration and non-integration coordination conditions follows from the relative strength that shading by a given party has under non-integration. In this case, both parties are able to recognize their respective contributions, which allows them shade through their entire ∆z i values. It therefore follows that Proposition 2. Coordination is more likely to take place under integration (nonintegration) when the θ variable is relatively low (high). Proof. Changes in the value of the shading parameter have the following effect on the NIC and INT conditions described in equations (1') and (2'), respectively,
We have assumed that ∆z B >0, which implies that ∆v B >0> ∆w A . As a result (∂ (2') / ∂ θ) < (∂ (1') / ∂ θ). That is, decrements in the value of θ will increase the integration coordination incentives over the non-integration ones. Given the fact that INT = NIC when θ = 1, we will get INT > NIC when θ < 1 INT < NIC when θ > 1. ■ Thus, similar (dissimilar) interests between both parties in the form of coordination payoffs would lead to a lower (higher) shading intensity, which encourages coordination within an integrated (nonintegrated) organizational environment.
2 It immediately follows that Lemma 1. If the intensity of shading depends positively on the existing payoff imbalances between bosses and managers, then
• Integration (Nonintegration) with coordination is more plausible when the profits of bosses and benefits of managers are similar (dissimilar). Corollary 1. Given ∆z i < 0, ∆z j > 0, and ∆v i < 0, social surplus tends to be higher under integration whenever coordination takes place, due partly to the lower θ values generated by the respective units.
The direct dependence of social surplus on the value of θ when comparing the NIC and INT settings implies that a lower shading parameter will tend to increase the social surplus generated within the INT setting relative to the NIC one. This result follows intuitively from Corollary 1, though a detailed formal analysis is presented below. At the same time, we will be illustrating how Proposition 3. Both organizational forms, an integrated cooperative and a nonintegrated private firm, may coexist in a coordinated equilibrium and the former may even obtain a higher social surplus than the latter one.
Choice of organizational form in duopoly
We turn now to a more formal analysis where the current model will be used to explain how both these organizational forms may coexist optimally within unequal coordinated equilibria. Cooperatives are more willing to coordinate when the θ (∆v, ∆w) values are small and similar for all units involved. At the same time, if heterogeneity is allowed for in the values of θ (∆v, ∆w), then any unit with a sufficiently divergent payoff structure [leading to a high θ (∆v, ∆w) value] has an incentive to avoid the integrated setting and imposes a nonintegrated though coordinated organizational form. Thus, highly unequal θ (∆v, ∆w) values between units favor the emergence of nonintegrated but coordinated structures. 3 In order to illustrate these points, we must allow for heterogeneous θ (∆v, ∆w) values to be defined between both units.
Consider two different θ i (∆v i , ∆w i ) values, θ A and θ B , one for each unit, though the analysis can easily account for a larger number of units. We concentrate on the nontrivial ∆z i < 0, and ∆z j > 0 case, and assume that i=A and j=B. Thus, in order for a nonintegrated equilibrium with coordination to be more plausible than an integrated equilibrium with coordination we need (1') > (2'), which, after some basic algebra, implies that
Note that ∆w A < 0 and ∆v B > 0. As a result, it is sufficient (though not necessary) for this inequality to hold that either θ A or θ B are higher than one with the other being at least as high. This implies that large payoff differentials between both parties within a unit may shift coordination to a nonintegrated environment. However, it is also possible for this inequality to hold when θ B > 1 and θ A < 1. In this case, the unit shifting faces larger payoff inequalities condition over the non-integration one. The analysis performed in the following section provides additional intuition on this option. between its parties. Moreover, ∆v B should be large enough to achieve coordination under nonintegration, an equilibrium which would not necessarily be plausible under integration.
Clearly, for the sake of completeness, an integrated equilibrium with coordination would be more plausible than a nonintegrated equilibrium with coordination if (2') > (1'), which implies that
In this case, it is sufficient (though not necessary) for this inequality to hold that either θ B < 1 and θ A ≤ 1 or θ B ≤ 1 and θ A < 1.
Social surplus could be higher under either one of these organizational structures. Note, however, that highly aligned and similar payoffs work in favor of an integrated organization [cooperative] due to the smaller value of θ generated by its units. We will show how, in the ∆z i < 0, and ∆z j > 0 case, there exist reasonable payoff and shading values that allow for an integrated organizational form to lead to a higher social surplus under coordination than the nonintegrated one. For this to be the case, we require that S INT > S NIC under coordination, i.e.
We know from equation (4) The main implications derived from equations (4) and (5) for the coexistence of both organizational forms within socially unequal coordinated equilibria are summarized as follows Proposition 4. In order for coordination under nonintegration to be more plausible but lead to a lower social surplus than coordination under integration it suffices to have
These requirements state that the unit avoiding integration must exhibit considerably unequal payoffs between the boss and the manager. In this case, the unit avoids integration but keeps on coordinating under nonintegration. At the same time, the other unit must exhibit similar negative payoffs that prevent its shading from affecting coordination under integration.
5
Proposition 5. In order for coordination under integration to be more plausible and lead to a higher social surplus than coordination under nonintegration it suffices to have 4 Note that it is also possible for both θ values to be higher than one with θ B ≤ θ A , which would weaken the strength of the requirements derived from equation (5). 5 Note that ∆z A < 0 is an essential requirement for social surplus to be higher under integration. If this were not the case and ∆vA > 0, then social surplus would always be lower under integration since ∆w B < 0 < ∆v A , which violates (5). Unit A managers shade in both cases due to the benefits lost under coordination, but when ∆v A > 0 the boss of the unit obtains positive profits that relatively increase the nonintegrated social surplus despite the intensity of his shading.
Note that equation (7) is implied by (6). Figure 2 illustrates the process determining the choice of organizational form by both units based on the corresponding value of the shading parameter. It also describes the potential coexistence of both organizational forms, i.e. cooperatives and private firms, within a given economic system while either coordinating or not. Note that each unit has complete information about the other one, so both units know the values of v i and w i , i = A, B, and each unit can calculate the resulting changes in the payoffs derived from coordination, that is, ∆v i and ∆w i , together with ∆z i . An immediate extension of the current model to which we refer to in the conclusion considers a stochastic environment where the payoffs and resulting shading values of each unit are unknown. Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, given perfect information on the set of payoffs, both units will calculate the resulting coordination incentives beforehand and, as a result, choose the best organizational form consisting of either an integrated or non-integrated one. If information was not perfect, particularly so when determining the calculation of the θ i variables, then a standard two-stage game will be played by both units, with expectations determining the potential equilibria of the second coordination stage being carried over to the initial organizational form choice and together determining the equilibrium of the game. 
